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Abstract
Reputation and trust-based models have been used extensively in diﬀerent application domains. These include
large online communities such as eBay, Amazon, YouTube and ad-hoc and wireless sensor networks. Recently, the
use of the models has gained popularity due to their eﬀectiveness in providing trusted systems or networks. These
models focus on online and historical data to determine the reputation of domain members. In this paper, we propose
a novel approach for obtaining trust values by focusing not only on online and historical data but also possible future
scenarios to anticipate events in the next time intervals. The data-driven framework is able to dynamically obtain and
inject data to predict the future trust value of every identity in the system. The advantage of this proactive approach
compared to other approaches is that informed decisions about the domain can be made before a compromise occurs.
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1. Introduction
Reputation and Trust-based models (RTMs) have gained popularity over the years, borrowing ideas from game
theory and Bayesian networks. RTMs are described as systems that provide mechanisms to produce a metric encap-
sulating reputation for each identity in a given application domains [1]. Generally, RTMs aim to provide information
that allow nodes to distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy members. The models encourage members to
cooperate through the use of incentives, and discourage maliciousness by punishment schemes such as isolation and
service denial.
RTMs have been adopted in applications that rely on the cooperation of domain members in order for the appli-
cation to function correctly. The models have been used extensively in various e-commerce and online communities
such as YouTube, Amazon and eBay as described in Section 2. Some literatures also suggest their use in domains
ranging from peer-to-peer (P2P) to mobile networks [2, 3, 4].
A common problem of RTMs is their vulnerability to collusion attacks, where two or more nodes can team up
to behave maliciously. Incentive policies that are used in P2P networks to ensure cooperation between nodes are
generally susceptible to collusion attacks as well. Traditionally, the models rely on recommendations that are based
on past interactions between the members provided by the same members to decide on the reputation of one another.
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The collusion problem is as a result of this reliance on members for recommendations. That is, each node keeps a
record about the behaviour of other nodes of interest to determine their reputation [5, 6].
Consider a P2P network situation where two nodes A and B have been compromised by an adversary. If A and
B exchange all of their secrets, then B can masquerade as A to all of B’s neighbours that node A shares pair-wise
keys with and vice versa. The keys subsequently obtained from other nodes can be reused by the attacker-controlled
nodes (A and B), cascading the impact of the compromise. Therefore, an attacker can control a node undetectably
by physically compromising the node, and the same node can in turn compromise other nodes [7]. Without counter-
measures, the eﬀects of this attack have been shown to dramatically aﬀect both the security and network performance
at run time as evidenced in poor reliability and poor quality of service, higher overhead and throughput degradation
[2].
In previous papers [8, 9], we described how trust decisions could be corrupted through recommendations made
by members. We proposed a framework that is capable of providing dynamic trust ratings of nodes at runtime and
predicting the future behaviour of nodes through the simulation of historical and online behaviour. The framework
does not rely on collective opinion and ratings to determine the reputation of system entities as it has been shown that
such an approach can result in attacks such as collusion [7]. Instead, the framework predicts a potential compromise
before the attack occurs so that informed decisions can be made, which may include isolating malicious members or
even denying them service. The framework presented in the papers constituted a ﬁrst step to exploit the Dynamic
Data-Driven Application Systems (DDDAS) paradigm to aid the prediction of trust values.
Although it is assumed that the predictive power of RTMs depend on the supposition that past behaviour is an
indication of future behaviour, this assumption might not be true with intoxication attacks [10, 11]. In this attack, a
member behaves as expected for a sustained period of time to obtain a good reputation and only starts to misbehave
afterwards. Intoxication makes it diﬃcult for the system to identify such misbehaving members because of their high
reputation. This attack occurs because the eﬀect of past good behaviour outweighs the eﬀect of current actions on
reputation. This paper extends this supposition further by not only considering past behaviour, but also the possible
future behaviour. Emphasis in the extended framework (presented in this paper) is placed on past histories, recent
behaviour and the future behaviour of members.
Behavioural expectation in any context can be motivated from the social perspective, where individuals within a
society are expected to behave in certain ways. A disreputable person could redeem himself through honest actions
and a trusted person could become less reputable if they demonstrate deceit over time [12]. This implies that reputation
and trust change over time, and are therefore dynamic. As reputation is a measure of trustworthiness, both trust and
reputation will used synonymously in this paper.
In literature, trust and reputation are considered as static, we however argue that they are dynamic and call for an
equally dynamic approach to computing and predicting trust. Dynamics of reputation is also reﬂected by its timeliness;
reputation is aggregated over time by taking into account recent behaviour and past histories [13]. Time is a necessary
dimension for reputation and this is the reason why the framework is useful; because it considers a node in diﬀerent
future scenarios to provide a more holistic view of domain events. Therefore, our approach is not only dynamic in
making predictions that provide information about the system but also in good time.
In order for any RTM to fulﬁl its functions, observations and experiences that determine the reputation of each
member have to be captured and represented numerically. That is, the qualitative information captured is converted
to a quantitative one, referred to as ratings or Trust Values (TVs). The framework adopts a data-driven approach by
using the information based on current behaviour, past histories and possible future scenarios in predicting an overall
TV of members. Data from the reality is continually injected into the simulation at speciﬁed time intervals to aid the
prediction. We argue that a more precise overall TV is obtained by considering historical, online and future (predicted)
behaviour. This has been veriﬁed with experiments carried out. By comparing the results obtained with and without
the use of prediction, the framework has shown to be more useful in terms of enabling informed decisions in time
before misbehaviour occurs.
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes existing reputation and trust-based models and Section 3
describes the dynamic framework. Some experimental analysis and results are presented in Section 4 while Section 5
contains discussion and future work.
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2. Related work
Relevant models that have contributed signiﬁcantly to reputation and trust management research are discussed
in this section. The models have been suggested for use in diverse domains ranging from online communities to
networks.
A signiﬁcant reputation system for Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) is that proposed by Buchegger et al. [2].
The RTM aims to detect and isolate misbehaving nodes by making it unattractive for any node to deny cooperation
with others. In this protocol, each node maintains a reputation rating and a trust rating about every other node of
interest. Nodes monitor and detect misbehaviour in their neighbourhood by means of an enhanced packet acknowl-
edgment(PACK) mechanism where the conﬁrmation of acknowledgment comes indirectly by overhearing the next
node forward the packet.
EigenTrust [14], a P2P reputation system’s algorithm, similar to the popular PageRank, works adequately if there
are no colluding members. The aim of EigenTrust is to reduce inauthentic ﬁles distributed by malicious peers. The
algorithm assigns each peer a unique global TV, based on the peer’s history of uploads. EigenTrust’s susceptibility to
collusion has been demonstrated in [6], where certain colluding peers are able to obtain high trust values.
In the work of Ganeriwal et al. [3], applicable to wireless sensor networks (WSNs), each sensor node maintains
reputation metrics. These metrics represent the past behaviour of other nodes and are used as an inherent aspect in
predicting their future behaviour. The model relies on network members to maintain the reputation of others based on
their experiences and uses this to evaluate their trustworthiness.
The online marketplace, eBay [15] has a reputation management system that uses a centralised approach for
collecting and computing the ratings of users. The system has a feedback forum scheme where buyers and sellers rate
each other for transactions based on their experiences with the other party. The system generally motivates buyers
and sellers to be honest. Incidents such as buyers perpetuating intoxication attacks by building a high rating with
low-valued transactions and then misbehaving with a high-valued one, have shown that there are drawbacks in the
eBay system.
Current research on using DDDAS focus on the simulation of physical, artiﬁcial or social entities. The simulation
is able to make predictions about how the entity would evolve and its future state. The predictions made by the
simulation can then inﬂuence how and where future data will be gathered from the entity, in order to focus on areas
of uncertainty [16]. This capability of the paradigm is exploited in this research to in data collection, simulation and
prediction of TVs.
3. Data-driven framework
This section describes the dynamic framework that uses a data-driven approach to function. The sequence of
events that take place for prediction and how the framework is useful in terms of timely feedback on future events is
discussed in this section. The components of the framework are the physical system, simulation and the controller
that computes trust. The components are depicted in Figure 1 while Figure 2 shows the steps required for trust
computation, prediction and countermeasures in the framework.
3.1. Physical system
The physical system is divided into logical regions of high-risk, medium-risk and low-risk. The idea behind the
division is that members are assigned to regions depending on their TVs. A member with a bad reputation and low TV
belongs to the high-risk region and a member with a good reputation and high TV will belong to the low-risk region
of the system.
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Figure 1: Framework components showing how data is injected into the simulation and the scenarios S1,S2,...Sn that are considered. tvo and tv f
are the online and future trust values for every member.
The grouping into regions helps in the management of the network to focus on the critical group of members that
require more attention. This will equally aid future informed decisions in the system.
3.2. Data collection
The simulation of the physical system runs concurrently with the system itself. However, the simulation is ahead
in time of the physical system. At the start and at speciﬁed intervals, a picture of the system is captured and adapted
in the simulation. This picture includes the current state of the system at a certain point in time.
For example, the TV of a certain node and all the connections to and from the node are captured. The TVs of
connected nodes are also obtained from the system. This TV is the online TV (tvo) that represents the behaviour of the
nodes based on current domain events and the new TV (tvR) that is computed from information about past histories
and the online ratings.
Figure 2: Trust prediction steps in the framework.
A set of discrete TVs are assumed in the framework and each value represents a degree of trust [8]. These
discrete degrees of trust introduce ﬂexibility into the application of our framework as diﬀerent behaviour corresponds
to diﬀerent levels of trust.
Qualitative data captured is converted to a quantitative one by an associated TV. Collected data from the system is
transformed to a value ranging from [0, 5], where a score of 0 means a node is completely untrusted, 5 means a node
is absolutely trusted and if 0 < TV < 5, then it implies that the node is trusted to a certain extent.
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3.3. Simulation
The values tvo and tvn from the physical system are injected into the simulation at the start. Using an agent based
simulation tool, the simulation runs for more time steps and considers what-if scenarios which are possible states a
member may be in the next time step or in the future. The number and type of scenarios will depend on the application
domain. The state of a member depends on the behaviour exhibited by the member. Examples of the scenarios are:
collusion attack; such as altering a message, intoxication and normal expected behaviour. After some speciﬁed time
intervals T1, T2, ...,Tn, the simulation state is observed and compared with reality; which must have also evolved (see
Figure 1). The framework is adaptive and if there are any diﬀerences in the predicted values and reality, the weights
for the trust computation are continually adjusted to reﬂect reality.
Possible outcomes in the scenarios are simulated to anticipate possible ﬂuctuations in member behaviour. This is
because the behaviour of members generally in any network, domain or context is dynamic and changes over time.
The scenarios are considered ahead of the time of the physical system. The TV is computed for a member in each
scenario considered. With this information, it is possible to compute and anticipate the future TV of the member as
described in the deﬁnitions below. In the controller, this information is combined with online and historical TVs to
obtain an overall TV.
The following are sample rules that change the state of members in simulation. Rules can be added, removed,
adjusted or customised depending on the domain of application. The rules below represent member behaviour in the
context of a P2P network of ﬁle transfer between peers.
Rule 1: A member will have a neutral state at the onset. This implies that the node has a neutral trust value of 2.5.
Rule 2: A member’s trust value will be decremented if it exhibits behaviour leading to collusion.
Rule 3: An member’s trust value will be incremented if it actively participates and consistently transfer ﬁles according
to the expected behaviour.
Rule 4: A member will be in a high risk region if its computed trust value is 1 and below. This implies that the state
of the node is not trusted.
Rule 5: A member will be in a medium risk region if its computed trust value is above 1 but below 4.
Rule 6: A member will be in a low risk region if its computed trust value is above 4. This implies that the node is at a
trusted state.
3.4. Trust computation
Computing trust in RTMs has been described as an abstract mathematical speciﬁcation of how available informa-
tion should be transformed into a usable metric [1]. This is also referred to as aggregation in some literature and it is
a critical component that determines the reliability of the framework. Trust computation is diﬃcult because is crucial
to the fulﬁlment of the functions of any trust-dependent system and has to be deﬁned in a precise way.
In this framework, the speciﬁcation is made through explicit equations discussed in [8]. The online and historical
trust values are obtained from the network and are used for the computation of the overall TV. The initial computation
of tvR is done without any consideration of any predicted values. The predicted values from the simulation are later
considered in computing the overall value tv.
Deﬁnition 1: Using the notation tvR to represent the initial TV in the physical system,
tvR = μhtvRh + μotv
R
o (1)
This value only considers online data and past histories of each member. Weights μo, μh and μ f are factors of
online, historical and future TVs respectively and they are introduced to allow ﬂexibility in the framework.
Deﬁnition 2: The simulation considers the possible scenarios a member may undertake in the future. The average
of the ratings derived from these scenarios determines the future TV tvSf .
tvSf =
(tvSo )S 1 + (tv
S





Therefore, an overall TV is computed by
tv = μhtvRh + μotv
R
o + μ f tv
S
f (3)
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f represent the historical, online TVs in the physical system, online TV in simulation and
the predicted TV in simulation respectively. The number of scenarios considered in simulation is represented with N
while (S 1, S 2, . . . S n) are the scenarios.
The weights are used to control the eﬀect of historical behaviour on the newly computed TVs. For example, if (μo,
μh) > 0 and μo > μh, more emphasis is placed on recent behaviour as opposed to historical behaviour. The emphasis
on recent behaviour prevents members from gaining a good reputation by behaving as expected over a sustained period
of time and only then starts to misbehave (this is a form of intoxication attack as described earlier).
The framework is adaptable to changing domain conditions because the behaviour of members is compared with
the predictions, if there are any inconsistencies; the weights are altered to reﬂect reality.
Figure 3: Other approaches
The framework performs better by predicting the future ratings of members. The prediction gives the system
enough time for preventive measures, making the framework proactive compared to other models that are reactive in
nature. The framework is proactive in terms of providing control such as downgrading the TV of suspect members
that are misbehaving before they can carry out an attack. This is contrary to how other approaches work, which only
downgrade the TV as a reaction to misbehaviour.
Figure 4: Dynamic approach
The assumption is that a member that has been compromised by an adversary for example, exhibits a sequence of
behaviour in order to misbehave. The simulation component of the framework applies the past histories and current
online behaviour and considers the compromised member in diﬀerent scenarios to make predictions and ultimately,
enable the framework to proactively control the system by downgrading TVs.
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An example is depicted in Figures 3 and 4 which show the time delay between the framework and other approaches
in predicting TVs and taking preventive measures. Figure 3 shows that the TV is only downgraded at time t5 after the
member exhibits maliciousness. The simulation in the framework predicts the maliciousness between time interval t1
and t2 and the TV is downgraded between t2 and t3 in Figure 4.
4. Analysis and results
In this section we present some experimental analysis to conﬁrm the hypothesis described in Figures 3 and 4
showing the reliability of the framework in providing timely predictions.
4.1. Case study
Incentive systems in P2P networks have generally been vulnerable to peer collusion. Collusion patterns have been
found in the Maze ﬁle-sharing system; a hybrid P2P network with central control described in [6]. In the paper,
collusion is deﬁned as a collaborative activity of a group of peers that grants its members beneﬁts they would not
be able to gain as individuals. Also considering the results of the research, the assumption in this framework is that
collusion is in pairs because collusion between groups of three or more peers is rare.
Experiments are carried out on a P2P network scenario where the dynamic framework predicts the TV of network
peers. Using a simpliﬁed dataset from Maze [17], let us consider a ﬁle sharing network between 100 peers with 4
colluding peers and 27 ﬁle transfers. In this experiment, ﬁles are shared in terms of messages transferred between
peers.
TV ranges from 0 to 5 and a TV of 0 means no trust and that of 5 implies absolute trust. We take a cynical
approach, where peers are not trusted on joining to the network. Each nodes has a neutral rating of 2.5 until they are
able to demonstrate their trustworthiness or maliciousness.
The network is modelled with the following properties:
• Peers interact with other peers by considering the communication mechanism found in a P2P network, causing
node states to change.
• The peers are self-contained as they are uniquely identiﬁable with a set of characteristics, behaviours and
attributes.
• The peers function independently and interact with other peers by transferring ﬁles.
• The peers are situated in a physical network which is a grid with contexts that hold the peers
4.2. Implementation environment
This section describes the setup of the simulation environment. Our experiments are performed using an agent
based modelling and simulation toolkit: Repast [18], with a mixture of Groovy and Java. The simulation parameters
are shown in table 1. The network is constructed as a graph of peers that are represented as vertices. The edges
between the vertices are the ﬁles transferred (one-way message exchange) between peers. The rules of interaction
used in this experiment are those stated in Section 3.
The experiment is carried out with and without the predictive capability of the framework. What-if scenarios of
collusion, intoxication and failure to forward ﬁles are considered in the simulation, as well as when the node behaves
as expected.
4.3. Preliminary results
Two experiments were carried out to observe the eﬀect of prediction on trust computation. The ﬁrst experiment
was with prediction and the other was without prediction. Figure 5 shows the results of using and not using prediction
in the same P2P network scenario. The ﬁgure shows the trust value of one of the malicious nodes over time. With
prediction, the framework detected and ﬂagged the 4 peers as malicious at 40 ticks and their ratings were downgraded
immediately, to anticipate the future.
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Table 1: Simulation parameters
Parameter Value
Total simulation time (in ticks) 100
Total number of nodes 100
Number of malicious nodes 4
Total number of messages transferred 27
Default historical trust value tvh 2.5
Default online trust value tvo 2.5
Online weight μo 0.5
Historical weight μh 0.3
Prediction weight μ f 0.2
This result is diﬀerent from the second experiment where the same data set was used but without prediction. In
the second experiment, the downgrade of the trust value began at 60 and reﬂected peer reputation after the peer had
carried out the attack.
Figure 5: P2P ﬁle-sharing network result (with and without prediction of trust values)
The trust values of the malicious peers dropped below the threshold value of 2. Therefore, the peers now logically
belong to the high-risk region of the physical system. Ultimately, the nodes are isolated because their TVs were below
the threshold for other peers to want to cooperate with them. Figure 6 compares the predicted trust with actual TV
for some peers. The graph shows the changes in the value of a peer exhibiting intoxication, a non-participating peer
that does not cooperate in terms of transferring ﬁles and thus, maintains a stable value, an untrusted peer whose TV
continues to drop, and a trusted peer that is active with a high value.
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Figure 6: Trust values of peer and the comparison of the values in the network and simulation
A comparison of the simulation results with the real physical system indicated some degree of variance between
the actual and predicted trust values. This might account for possible false-positives or false-negatives generated from
our simulation. Hence, we shall explore approaches to improve the correlation of these trust values (i.e. simulated
and real system) in the future.
5. Discussion and future work
This paper presents a novel framework that predicts ratings and ﬂags malicious members in good time for security
mitigation in the system. This can potentially improve the reliability of the system. The framework was applied
with and without prediction to the same dataset and the observation is that the framework is more proactive with
predictive capability. The approach adopted in the framework treats the problem of collusion attack by not relying on
recommendations made by members, since such members can actually corrupt the system.
When compared to a distributed reputation and trust-based model, a centralised predictive framework may have
a relatively higher performance overhead, but it is more timely in terms of misbehaviour detection as illustrated in
Figures 3 and 4. Thus, we propose the use of our approach in niche environments where the security requirement is
more critical compared to other non-functional requirements.
The success of a trust-based model is measured by how accurately the computed values reﬂect the reality of
future interactions among members. Therefore, in the future, we aim to test the accuracy of predictions in reﬂecting
the reality. We will also consider approaches to parameterise the rules that change the state of members for more
dynamism in the framework in the near future.
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